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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 2012, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce
(“China”) submitted a request for consultations (“complaint”) to the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) alleging that Italy’s feed-intariff program (“FIT Program” or “FIT”) is inconsistent with Italy’s
obligations under three WTO Agreements.1 First, China has alleged
that the Italian FIT Program violates certain provisions of both the
1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT 1994”)2 and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs
Agreement”) by providing solar-photovoltaic (“solar-PV”)
generators and components made in the European Union with an
advantage that is unavailable to solar-PV generators and components
made outside of the European Union.3 To substantiate this allegation,
1. See Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain
Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector, WT/DS452/1 at 1 (Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Consultations].
2. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (establishing that no measure
may impose less favorable treatment upon imported products than that granted to
like products of domestic origin).
3. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (claiming that the Italian FIT
Program violates Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement because those TRIMs
provide an advantage to domestic goods unavailable to imported goods). See
generally Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
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China has pointed to the Fourth and Fifth Italian Energy Bills, in
which the Italian legislature agrees to grant ten percent subsidies on
electricity produced by solar-PV generators so long as the generators
consist of certain components made in the European Union.4 Second,
China has alleged that the Italian FIT Program violates certain
provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (“SCM Agreement”) by providing a prohibited subsidy
conditioned upon the use of domestic solar-PV components over
imported components.5 As evidence of this allegation, China has
submitted that the Italian Government sets a price, guaranteed for
twenty years, at which it purchases the electricity produced by Italian
solar-PV generators.6 China has claimed that Italy’s guaranteed
purchase of solar-based electricity confers a “benefit” upon those
solar-PV generators because the guaranteed purchase provides more
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33
I.L.M. 1153 [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement] (stating that measures requiring the
purchase of products of domestic origin are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994). China also alleged that the Italian FIT Program violated the “mostfavored-nation” principle enshrined in Article I of the GATT 1994, and the
principle disfavoring protectionist measures in Article III:1 of the GATT 1994.
Due to the lack of current case law analyzing these principles, however, this
comment will focus solely upon the alleged violation of Article III:4 of the GATT
1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.
4. See Decreto Ministeriale 5 luglio 2012, n. 143, in G.U. 10 luglio 2012, n.
159 (It.), arts. 4(5)(d), 5(2)(a) (stating that solar-PV units whose primary
components were made in the European Union or the European Economic Area
will receive some degree of priority in determining their eligibility to receive an
extra (1) 20 €/MWh if in use by December 31, 2013; (2) 10 €/MWh if in use by
December 31, 2014; or (3) 5 €/MWh if in use after December 31, 2014). Decreto
Ministeriale 5 maggio 2011, n. 238, in G.U. 12 maggio 2011, n. 109 (It.), art.
14(1)(d) (raising the purchasing price for electricity from solar-PV units by ten
percent if at least sixty percent of the total production cost derives from
components made in the European Union).
5. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (alleging that the Italian FIT Program
is prohibited under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement because it
provides a benefit “contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods”).
See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 33 I.L.M. 1153, arts. 3.1(b), 3.2 (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]
(prohibiting subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods).
6. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that the issues which China
would like to raise in the course of consultations include, but are not limited to,
Italy’s Fifth and Fourth Energy Bills). Both the Fifth and Fourth Feed-in Schemes
provide that incentives will apply for twenty years. See D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 5.4;
D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 12.2.
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than adequate remuneration for the electricity that the generators
produce, which is prohibited under the SCM Agreement.7 Italy had
sixty days from the date of submission of China’s complaint to
respond to China’s allegations; because the parties have failed to
reach an agreement, China may now request that the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body establish a panel to review its grievances.8
China’s complaint to the WTO has important implications for the
development of WTO jurisprudence. From a legal standpoint, the
complaint raises the question of whether WTO Member States may
use policy tools to pursue national human health and environmental
initiatives if those initiatives conflict with the free-trade principles of
the WTO.9 A majority of EU Member States have already adopted
FIT Programs in pursuit of similar national initiatives;10 yet, despite
the widespread use of FITs, to date, only one WTO case has
addressed the consistency of the FIT with the WTO Agreements. 11
7. See SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii), (b) (establishing that a subsidy
exists when a government purchases goods in such a way that confers a “benefit”
on the seller).
8. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (stating that
the complainant may request that the WTO establish a panel if the parties fail to
settle a dispute following sixty-day consultations). See generally European Union
and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy
Generation Sector, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds452_e.htm (last updated Dec. 18, 2012) (listing the dates of the requests for
consultations).
9. See M.S. Srikar, Renewable Energy Programmes in the European Union,
Japan, and the United States 10 (Ctr. for WTO Studies, Working Paper No. 200/4,
2012) (observing that state support of renewable energy policies inconsistent with
WTO law represents a source of trade friction).
10. See Conference Report, 8th Workshop of the Int’l Feed-In Cooperation
(Nov. 18–19, 2010), http://www.feed-in-cooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/8thworkshop/index.php (follow “Conclusions” hyperlink) (stating that twenty-three of
twenty-seven EU Member States use FIT programs to incentivize use of renewable
energy sources and that nearly 100% of all new solar-PV units since 1997 have
been installed in countries using FITs).
11. See Marie Wilke, Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Subsidy
Rules: An Initial Legal Review 1 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev.
Programme on Trade and Envt., Issue Paper No. 4, 2011), available at
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/112508/?view=document/ (highlighting that the first
complaint addressing the legality of FITs in the WTO was submitted in September
2010 and that the case focused primarily on the domestic content requirement and
the subsidy nature of the FIT). See generally Panel Reports, Canada – Certain
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As other WTO Member States adopt their own FIT Programs, 12 more
complaints are likely to follow, and the demand for clear, instructive
WTO jurisprudence will only grow.13 For this reason, legal
scholarship evaluating the legality of the FIT Program would provide
much-needed direction to WTO Member States as they tailor their
FITs to comply with the WTO covered agreements.14
Given the unclear legal status of the FIT Program, this comment
evaluates and predicts the outcome of the current dispute before the
WTO. It explores the manner in which the Italian FIT Program likely
violates Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 by mandating that solar-PV generators use a certain
percentage of EU-made solar-PV components to be eligible for an
increase in the sale price of the electricity that they produce. The
same FIT Program, however, is unlikely to violate Articles 3.1(b)
and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement because it may fail to confer a
“benefit” upon solar-PV generators as required by Article 1.1(b), and
therefore, it will not constitute a subsidy.
Part II of this comment begins by providing an overview of the
tariff supplied within the Italian FIT Program through the
Renewables Decree and the Fourth and Fifth Italian Energy Bills.
This part also reviews Canada – Measures, the only case in which a
WTO panel has assessed the consistency of a FIT with the WTO
covered agreements. Lastly, Part II concludes by defining the
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector, WT/DS412/R; Canada –
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS426/R (Dec. 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Canada – Measures Panel Report], rev’d in part, Appellate Body
Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector, ¶ 6.1, WT/DS412/AB/R; Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program, ¶ 6.1, WT/DS426/AB/R (May 6, 2013) [hereinafter Canada – Measures
Appellate Body Report] (ruling that the Ontario FIT Program is inconsistent with
the GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement, but not the SCM Agreement).
12. See Wilke, supra note 11, at vi (observing that eighty countries have
adopted various measures to support renewable energy production, the most
common measure being the FIT).
13. See Srikar, supra note 9, at 25, 168–69 (positing that the success of FIT
schemes around the world makes renewable-energy-incentive programs a “fertile
ground” for WTO litigation by countries like India).
14. Cf. WTO Rules Ontario Green Energy Tariff Unfair, CBC NEWS, Nov. 19,
2012,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/11/19/wto-green-energy.html
(highlighting that the Canada – Measures case is viewed as a trial by governments
to favor local producers who promote renewable energy projects).
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obligations originating within the relevant articles of the GATT
1994, TRIMs Agreement, and SCM Agreement, which the Panel
would apply in the instant dispute.
Part III begins by arguing that the Italian FIT Program likely
violates the national treatment obligation of Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994 within the scope of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 as well as the
Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement. Part III also argues,
however, that the Italian FIT Program may not confer a “benefit” as
defined by Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement because the Italian
Government has pared down its FIT Program to provide increasingly
less remuneration to solar-PV generation companies in the Italian
market.
Part IV recommends that Italy (a) appeal any prospective WTO
Panel Decision to the Appellate Body and prepare responses to
China’s counterarguments; (b) remove the domestic content
requirement from its FIT Program as requested by the WTO; or (c)
seek to phase out its FIT Program altogether in search of less costly
alternatives. Lastly, Part V concludes that Italy will continue to
degress its tariff rates and pare down its FIT Program because of the
burden of the FIT on taxpayers and Italy’s sovereign debt crisis.

II. BACKGROUND
In 2011, Italy was the world’s second largest market for solar-PV
energy,15 behind only Germany.16 Italy’s prominence in the solar-PV
arena only continues to grow, especially now that Italian individuals
increasingly purchase small-model solar-PV plants.17 Italy’s
increased production of solar-PV generators has promoted clean,
15. See Photovoltaic Barometer, EUROBSERV’ER 58 (2013), available at
http://www.energies-renouvelables.org/observ-er/stat_baro/observ/baro-jdp9.pdf
(calculating that in 2011 Italy added 9303 MWp to its solar-PV capacity, more
than any other EU Member State that year).
16. See id. at 59 (reporting Italy’s total solar-PV capacity at 12,783 MWp and
16,361 MWp in 2011 and 2012, respectively, with Germany’s capacity at 25,094
MWp and 32,698 MWp for the same years).
17. See Rapporto Statistico 2011: Solare Fotovoltaico, GESTORE DEI SERVIZI
ENERGETICI 8 (2011), available at http://www.gse.it/it/Statistiche/
RapportiStatistici/Pagine/default.aspx (follow “Solare Fotovoltaico - Rapporto
Statistico 2011” hyperlink) [hereinafter Italian Solar Generation] (stating that
units with less than 200 kW accounted for ninety-seven percent of total
installments and one-third of Italy’s total solar-PV capacity).
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renewable energy sources, while also serving to fill the void in
electricity supply left by Italy’s own rejection of nuclear energy. 18 As
one of the largest national economies in the world to renounce
nuclear power,19 Italy has resorted to solar-PV energy through its FIT
Program to produce enough electricity to meet its consumption
needs.20 Yet, because the FIT Program allegedly favors the use of
domestic components over imported ones, China has argued that the
FIT violates certain provisions of the GATT 1994, the TRIMs
Agreement, and the SCM Agreement.21 To grasp the range of
China’s arguments, this comment begins by establishing a basic
understanding of the Italian FIT Program, its legislative and
ministerial underpinnings, and its coherence within the framework of
the WTO covered agreements.

A. LEGISLATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ITALIAN FIT PROGRAM
1. Italian Legislative Decree on Renewable Sources
On March 3, 2011, the Italian Parliament published Legislative
Decree No. 28/2011 (“Decree”),22 which positioned Italy to reach its
18. See Craig Morris, Italy Rejects Nuclear Power, RENEWABLES INT’L (June
13,
2011),
http://www.renewablesinternational.net/italy-rejects-nuclearpower/150/537/31171 (reporting that Berlusconi acknowledged that Italy must turn
to renewable energy after rejecting nuclear power).
19. See id. (reporting that, as of 2011, Italy was the world’s largest national
economy with a nuclear-free generating capacity and noting that Germany,
Austria, and Switzerland are also phasing out nuclear power).
20. See Statistical Report 2011: Renewable Power Plants in Italy, GESTORE
DEI SERVIZI ENERGETICI, 7 (2011), available at http://www.gse.it/en/
dataandfinancialstatement/Pages/default.aspx (follow “Download Statistical
Report 2011 (pdf)” hyperlink) [hereinafter GSE Report 2011] (showing that in
2010 and 2011, Italy consumed 342,933 GWh and 346,368 GWh of electricity,
respectively, while its actual solar-PV generation jumped from 1906 to 10,266
GWh—a 466.5% increase); see also Stefania Gorgoglione, The New Italian
Legislation on Renewable Energy, 3 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y 205, 205
(2012) (observing that as of June 2010, Italy met its objective when renewable
energy sources accounted for nearly twenty-six percent of total national electricity
consumption).
21. Consultations, supra note 1, at 3.
22. See The Renewables Decree: Introduction of a New System of Incentives
for Renewable Energy Plants, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://www.mwe.com/publications/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PublicationDetail&pub=
5468&PublicationTypes=d9093adb-e95d-4f19-819a-f0bb5170ab6d (announcing
that the Decree will replace the previous FIT structure and will take effect on
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benchmark for use of renewable energy sources by 2020.23 The
Decree established several incentives to encourage increased
production of electricity from solar-PV generators, including (1) a
fixed price for the purchase of electricity, independent of market
value, to provide owners of generators with a fair return on their
investments; (2) twenty-year FIT contracts equal in duration to the
lifetime of the generators, under which the Italian Government will
purchase the solar-PV-based electricity; (3) a guarantee that the
Italian Government will purchase electricity and feed it into the grid;
and (4) long-term market stability for investors.24
Under the framework of the Decree, the Italian Government
utilizes a number of public utilities to execute its FIT Program.
Companies such as Italy’s largest utility, ENEL S.p.A., and its
subsidiary, ENEL Green Power, both of which are publicly owned, 25
develop the technologies and build the solar-PV generators that
allow both households and businesses to produce electricity for
national consumption.26 In turn, the public utility company Gestore
January 1, 2013). See generally Decreto Legislativo 3 marzo 2011, n. 81/L, in G.U.
28 marzo 2011, n. 28 (It.) (implementing EU Directive 2009/28/CE to promote the
use of renewable energy).
23. See Council Directive 2009/28, 99 Annex I.A, 2009 O.J. (L 140/16) Annex
I (EC) (providing that Italy shall increase the share of its total electricity
consumption produced by renewable energy sources from 5.2% in 2005 to 17% by
2020).
24. See Srikar, supra note 9, at 21–22 (detailing how renewable energy
producers receive a long-term premium for the electricity they produce and that
electric grid utilities are obligated to purchase the electricity to guarantee
producers a reasonable return on their investment); see also Michael E. Streich,
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009: A “Fit”-ing Policy for North
America?, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 419, 425–26 (2011) (noting that utility companies
pay generation companies more than the wholesale price of non-renewable energy
to promote the social and environmental benefits of renewable energy and to
defray initial investment costs with respect to developing renewable energy
projects).
25. See About Us, ENEL, http://www.enel.com/en-GB/group/about_us/ (last
updated June 30, 2013) [hereinafter About Us, ENEL] (stating that the Italian
Ministry of Economy and Finance holds 31.24% of Enel’s shares); see also Adam
L. Freeman & Flavia Krause Jackson, Cassa Depositi Given More Time to Sell
Enel
or
Terna
Stake,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS,
Mar.
12,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1LMEGqQCUHI
(reporting that the Italian state-backed bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti owns about
ten percent of Enel).
26. See Solar Power, ENEL GREEN POWER, http://www.enelgreenpower.com/
en-GB/plants/renewable_energy/solar/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2013)
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Servizi Energetici (“GSE”)27 purchases the electricity from the solarPV generators at a set price per kilowatt hour (“kWh”).28 ENEL
distributes the electricity through an extensive network of
transmission and distribution assets,29 as does the publicly-owned
electricity-transmission operator Terna Rete Italia,30 which controls
ninety-eight percent of the national power grid in Italy.31
In effect, the FIT Program acts as a purchasing guarantee, for both
owners of solar-PV generators and investors.32 Because GSE is
required to purchase electricity generated from solar-PV energy,33
and the prices that the government sets are generally high,34 solar-PV
(describing how Enel S.p.A. promotes innovation in the field of PV technology,
particularly through its subsidiary Enel Green Power Retail).
27. See Statuto del “Gestore dei Servizi Energetici – GSE S.p.A.”, art. 8
(adopted pursuant to Decreto Legislativo 16 marzo 1999, n. 79 (It.)), available at
http://www.gse.it/it/Azienda/GSE_Documenti/Azienda/Missione/Documenti/Mode
llo%20organizzativo/Statuto_GSE2010.pdf [hereinafter GSE S.p.A.] (providing
that the sole owner of GSE is the Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”) and
that the MEF exercises its shareholder rights jointly with the Ministry of Economic
Development).
28. See GSE Report 2011, supra note 20, at 53 (stating that GSE purchases
electricity from renewable energy sources and then trades and resells the
electricity).
29. See About Us, ENEL, supra note 25 (stating that Enel distributes electricity
through a network of 1.9 million km to serve approximately sixty-one million
customers).
30. See
About
Terna
Rete
Italia,
TERNA
RETE
ITALIA,
http://www.ternareteitalia.it/default_eng.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013)
(highlighting that, as a grid management and transmission operator, Terna Rete
Italia manages the flow of electricity along 63,500 km of high-voltage lines of the
Italian electricity system); see also Transmitting Energy, Transmitting Values,
TERNA GROUP, http://www.terna.it/default.aspx?tabid=1778 (last updated July 24,
2013) (reporting that Terna’s major shareholder is Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, with
29.85% of shares).
31. Terna S.p.A. Company Information, HOOVERS, http://www.hoovers.com/
company-information/cs/company-profile.Terna_SpA.614f1537e7f27283.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Terna S.p.A. Company Information]; see
also About Terna Rete Italia, supra note 30 (reporting that Terna also manages 468
transforming and switching stations in Italy).
32. See Wilke, supra note 11 (conceptualizing the FIT Program as a
purchasing guarantee because the electric grid utilities are obligated to purchase
electricity from the renewable energy producers, which guarantees the producers a
return on their investment).
33. See Streich, supra note 24, at 425–26 (stating that FITs require utility
companies to purchase electricity from renewable sources at a government-fixed
“premium” rate for a guaranteed number of years).
34. See Paul Gipe, New Italian Tariffs Complex and Robust, RENEWABLE
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generators are guaranteed to receive a return on their investment
involving little or no risk.35 Investors are also more likely to support
renewable-energy-generation projects because they, too, will receive
a return on their investments.36 Thus, both generators and investors
earn a return, and the Italian Government may further its own policy
objectives.37
In light of the positive effect of the Decree’s incentives on solarPV generation, China has argued that the incentives play a pivotal
role in the effectuation of the FIT Program within Italy.38 According
to Article 25(10), the Italian Government determines its FIT levels
according to the incentives provided to solar-PV generators in other
EU Member States.39 China has raised this issue in light of the
Decree’s role in implementing the Fourth and Fifth Energy Bills.40
2. Fourth Energy Bill
On May 5, 2011, the Italian Ministry of Economic Development
decreed the Fourth Energy Bill,41 in which it instituted annual
ENERGY WORLD (July 9, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/
article/2011/07/new-italian-tariffs-complex-and-robust-2000-mw-may-beinstalled-in-2011 [hereinafter Gipe, New Italian Tariffs] (emphasizing that despite
reports that the new Italian FIT program dramatically cuts tariffs, the tariffs remain
fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs when adjusted for high
levels of sunshine).
35. See Srikar, supra note 9, at 23 (stating that guaranteed prices, network
connections, and purchases lead to an “almost risk-free contract”).
36. See id. at 22 (stating that the level and duration of guaranteed support has
been crucial to attract investors and to increase exploitation of renewable energy
sources).
37. See id. at 9 (noting that these objectives include (1) environmental
protection; (2) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and use of nuclear power;
(3) enhanced energy supply security; (4) reduced dependence on fossil fuels; and
(5) enhanced economic competition and job creation).
38. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 1 (alleging that the incentives created
by the Decree directly relate to the implementation of the Feed-in Schemes in the
Fourth and Fifth Energy Bills).
39. See D.Lgs. n. 28/2011, art. 25.10(b) (providing that a new Feed-in Scheme
will determine tariff levels based on reductions in technology costs and the
incentives applied by other EU Member States).
40. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 2 (advancing that the Renewables
Decree incentivizes the production of electrical energy from solar-PV
installations).
41. See Italy Issues Fourth Conto Energia: New Feed-In Tariffs for
Production of Photovoltaic Energy in 2011-2016, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY 7
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reductions, or degressions, in the FITs for its new solar-PV
generators.42 The tariff degression provides incentives for
technological improvements that lower production costs and
minimize the oversupply of electricity fed into the grid.43 Ultimately,
degression allows renewable energy sources to achieve grid-parity
with traditional energy sources, rendering future FIT support of
renewable energy generators unnecessary.44
In terms of its WTO-consistency, however, China has taken issue
with Article 14(1)(d) of the Fourth Energy Bill,45 which states that
solar-PV generators will receive a ten-percent increase in the price
paid for the electricity they produce, so long as sixty percent of the
components used to construct the generators is sourced within the
European Union or the European Economic Area.46 This type of
provision, known as a domestic content requirement (“DCR”),
supports local producers of solar-PV components.47 The DCR
(2011), available at www.mwe.com/info/news/wp0511a.pdf [hereinafter Italy
Issues Fourth Conto Energia] (indicating that one overall feed-in tariff will apply
in the 2013 Fourth Feed-in Scheme, which combines the electricity base price and
the premium). See generally D.M. n. 238/2011 (marking Italy’s response to EU
Directive 2009/28/CE and to the Renewables Decree); see also id. arts. 11.2(a),
15.2(a), 17.2(a) (providing that the Fourth Bill Feed-in Scheme applies to units
with a capacity of at least 1 kW commissioned between June 1, 2011 and
December 31, 2016).
42. See Arne Klein et al., Evaluation of Different Feed-in-Tariff Design
Options – Best Practice Paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation, ENERGY
ECON. GRP., 40, 43 (2008), http://www.feed-in-cooperation.org/wDefault_7/
wDefault_7/download-files/research/best_practice_paper_2nd_edition_final.pdf
(stating that, beginning in 2007, Italy reduced its FITs for electricity from new
solar-PV units by two percent annually to balance public support levels and energy
costs).
43. See id. at 40, 43 (adding that degression incorporates technological
learning into renewable energy policy by leading to greater efficiency,
transparency, and security for potential investors).
44. See Mark Fulton et al., FiTs Adjust While Delivering Scale in 2010,
DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS 2–3, http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/
EN/_media/DBCCA_Fit_Update_20100727.pdf (arguing that an FIT with an
established degression scheme should allow renewable energy to reach grid-parity
with fossil fuels by reducing the cost of capital over time, lowering the price of
energy in a transparent way, and easing barriers to entry).
45. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 1 (claiming that Article 14(1)(d)
incentivizes the use of solar-PV components in contravention of the GATT 1994,
the TRIMs Agreement, and the SCM Agreement).
46. See D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d).
47. Cf. Kenina Lee, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a
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provides that solar-PV generators that use certain quantities or types
of components manufactured in the European Union will qualify for
an increase in the wholesale price of the electricity they produce.48
3. Fifth Energy Bill
On July 5, 2012, the Italian Minister of Economic Development
passed the Fifth Energy Bill, which entered into force on August 27,
2012.49 Like the Fourth Energy Bill, the Fifth Energy Bill instructs
GSE to award premiums on top of FITs for generators whose
modules and inverters have been manufactured in either the
European Union or the European Economic Area.50 Article 2(1)(v) of
the Fifth Energy Bill and GSE’s Implementing Rules to the Fifth
Energy Bill51 both specify that solar-PV generators must certify the
EU/EEA origin of their components to qualify for the extra
premium.52
Sustainable Future? Evaluating the Consistency of Canadian and Chinese
Renewable Energy Policies with WTO Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
57, 66 (2012) (arguing that compliance with the DCR in the Ontario FIT Program
provided manufacturers of solar-PV components with an advantage, such as a set
price paid for the electricity that the projects generate).
48. Italy Issues Fourth Conto Energia, supra note 41, at 2.
49. See Fifth Feed-In Scheme, GESTORE SERVIZI ENERGETICI,
http://www.gse.it/en/feedintariff/Photovoltaic/FifthFeedinScheme/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Oct. 22, 2012) (stating that the Fifth
Bill Feed-in Scheme went into effect on August 27, 2012, but that the Fourth Bill
Feed-in Scheme will continue to apply for small solar-PV units commissioned
before that date and for large units commissioned within seven months of the
relevant ranking list). See generally D.M. n. 143/2012 (phasing out the Fourth Bill
Feed-in Scheme and adding new incentives to the FIT).
50. See D.M. n. 143/2012, arts. 4(5)(d), 5(2)(a) (stating that solar-PV
generators whose primary components were made in the European Union or
European Economic Area will receive an extra (1) 20 €/MWh if in use by
December 31, 2013; (2) 10 €/MWh if in use by December 31, 2014; and (3) 5
€/MWh if in use after December 31, 2014).
51. See Regole Applicative per L’Iscrizione ai Registri e per L’Accesso alle
Tariffe Incentivanti DM 5 Luglio 2012 (Quinto Conto Energia), GESTORE SERVIZI
ENERGETICI, 34 (2012), available at http://www.gse.it/it/Conto%20Energia/GSE_
Documenti/Fotovoltaico/03%20Documenti/REGOLE%20APPLICATIVE_CE%2
05_07082012.pdf (noting that various types of modules and inverters used in solarPV units must be certified using identification codes and serial numbers to
determine whether they were manufactured within the European Union or
European Economic Area).
52. See D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 2(1)(v) (indicating that the modules and
conversion groups must have the typical characteristics of EU/EEA solar-PV
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B. THE ONTARIO FIT PROGRAM IN CANADA – MEASURES
To evaluate the legality of the Italian FIT Program, this comment
applies to the present case the factual and analytical framework from
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector
(“Canada – Measures”), the only case in which the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body has evaluated the legality of an FIT Program.53 Like
the Italian FIT Program, the FIT Program at issue in Canada –
Measures was a government-run program.54 The Ontario Power
Authority (“OPA”), as a publicly-directed utility,55 set FIT rates and
administered the FIT contracts and twenty-year guarantees for the
sale price of electricity that the renewable energy generators
produced.56 The renewable energy generators then entered into a
contractual relationship with several groups, including local
distribution networks, to ensure that the generators were able to feed
their electricity into Ontario’s electricity grid.57 As a public
company,58 Hydro One then operated the distribution networks,
worked with other local distribution companies to connect the
generator to the network and manage the feed-in process, and sold
the electricity to consumers.59 Once the consumers received
modules and conversion groups).
53. See also Wilke, supra note 11, at vi (highlighting that the Canada –
Measures case analyzes the legality of the DCR as a protectionist measure and the
FIT Program as a subsidy).
54. See Streich, supra note 24, at 434–35 (stating that Ontario’s FIT Program
standardizes rules, regulations, contractual provisions, and electricity prices to
facilitate the development of renewable electricity generation).
55. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.195 (stating that
the OPA, acting under the authority of the Electricity Act and the Green Energy
and Green Economy Act, launched the FIT Program at the direction of the Ontario
Minister of Energy).
56. See id. ¶¶ 7.64–7.65 (finding that the OPA sets twenty or forty-year
contracts and pays a set price per kWh of electricity fed into the Ontario electricity
system); see also Wilke, supra note 11, at 3 (adding that the OPA handles the
development and administration of the program, which includes price-setting and
contract administration).
57. Wilke, supra note 11, at 4.
58. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.34 (noting that
Hydro One, a Crown Corporation owned one-hundred percent by the Ontario
Government, holds and operates ninety-seven percent of the transmission and
distribution systems).
59. See id. ¶¶ 7.147, 7.149 (establishing that Hydro One distributes the
electricity to almost one-third of the consumers in Ontario and was designed by the
Ontarian Government to make returns from its electricity transmission and
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electricity, the Government of Ontario then paid the FIT rates to the
generators on the basis of the contracts that the OPA established.60
On the Government’s behalf, the OPA used the FIT Program to
jumpstart green industries, reduce emissions, promote job creation,
and create a diverse mix of energy supply—particularly as Ontarians
had decided to close several coal-fired power generators.61 To secure
these objectives, the Government of Ontario instituted a “Minimum
Required Domestic Content Level,”62 a DCR that requires at least
sixty percent of the components used in renewable-energy generators
participating in the FIT to be sourced from Ontario.63 The facilities
that failed to meet the DCR defaulted on their contractual obligations
and were no longer able to qualify for the FIT Program.64
When the panel ruled on the legality of the Ontario FIT Program,
it found that the DCR violated Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement,
as well as the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994, by mandating that Ontarian generators use components
sourced from Canada to gain the advantage associated with the FIT
Program.65 The panel also found that the Ontario FIT Program did
not constitute a subsidy because the complainants failed to prove that
the FIT Program conferred a “benefit” onto owners of solar-PV
generators under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.66 On appeal,
distribution); see also Wilke, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that local distribution
companies and transmission asset-owners work with electricity producers to
connect to the network and manage the feed-in program).
60. See Wilke, supra note 11, at 3 (elaborating that the FIT premiums are paid
on the basis of the supplier contract between OPA and the providers).
61. Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.65.
62. See id. ¶ 7.161 (listing the various FIT and microFIT contracts and their
respective domestic content requirements).
63. Id. ¶¶ 7.158–7.161 (providing an overview of the Japanese position on the
DCR).
64. See id. ¶¶ 7.164–7.166 (determining that the “Minimum Required
Domestic Content Level” is a “necessary condition and prerequisite” for an
electricity producer to participate in the FIT Program and that failure to meet the
required content level renders the producer in breach of its contractual obligations).
65. See id. ¶ 7.166 (finding that the “Minimum Required Domestic Content
Level” violated Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article III:4 of GATT
1994 because (1) it involved the purchase or use of components from a domestic
source, Canada, within the meaning of Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List; and
(2) compliance with the DCR was necessary to participate in the FIT Program, an
advantage within the meaning of Paragraph 1(a)).
66. See id. ¶¶ 7.312, 7.328 (finding that the Ontario FIT Program did not
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the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding concerning the
inconsistency of the DCR with the provisions of the GATT 1994 and
the TRIMs Agreement67 but overturned the panel’s finding that the
Ontario FIT did not confer a “benefit” under Article 1.1(b).68 Canada
– Measures is not binding upon future panels because the WTO does
not adhere to stare decisis; nevertheless, the success of the WTO
dispute settlement system hinges upon adherence to the provisions in
the covered agreements as interpreted by prior panels and the
Appellate Body.69 Because of the unique nature of the panel’s and
Appellate Body’s analysis in Canada – Measures,70 this Comment
uses the Canada – Measures dispute as a guide in evaluating whether
the Italian FIT Program violates the WTO covered agreements. Like
Japan and the European Union in Canada – Measures, China has
challenged the FIT DCR under Article III:4 of GATT 1994 and
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement,71 as well as the FIT support
constitute a subsidy because it did not confer a “benefit” within the meaning of
Article 1.1(b), particularly given the fundamental role of electricity in modern life,
the failure of wholesale electricity markets to attract sufficient investment, and the
below-market price for electricity produced from renewable energy sources).
67. Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 6.1(b)(v)
(finding, with respect to the case of Japan, that the FIT Program is not covered by
Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 and that, as a result, the panel’s conclusion that
the Minimum Required Domestic Content Levels prescribed under the FIT
Program are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and Article
III:4 of the GATT 1994 stands).
68. Id. ¶¶ 5.219–5.220.
69. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 108–09, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
(explaining that panels and the Appellate Body are influenced—though not
formally bound—by previous Dispute Settlement Body decisions); Panel Report,
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 6.10, WT/DS8/R (July 11, 1996)
(acknowledging that GATT and WTO panel reports create legitimate expectations
among WTO Members and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute); see also Panel Report, United States – Continued
Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶¶ 7.93, 7.175, WT/350/R
(Oct. 1, 2008) (noting Norway’s argument that even though panels are not bound
by previous findings of the Appellate Body, predictability and stability require that
rules be interpreted consistently to build on previous decisions and to avoid
unconsidered departures from previous interpretations).
70. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.122 (noting that
Canada – Measures is the first case in which a panel has been asked to interpret
and apply Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994).
71. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that, under Article III:4 of
the GATT 1994, the FIT DCR grants less favorable treatment to like products of
imported origin than to domestic origin, and that under Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the

688

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[29:3

network for renewable energy sources under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2
of the SCM Agreement.72

C. THE WTO AGREEMENTS
1. Articles 1, 2.1, and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement
Under Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement, the WTO defines
TRIMs as “investment measures related to trade in goods only.” 73
For the Italian FIT DCR to constitute a TRIM, it would need to
encourage investment in the production of solar-PV generation
components74 and favor the components sourced from the European
Union or the European Economic Area over those imported from
abroad.75 Evidence of favorable treatment includes companies either
moving to Italy and other EU/EEA Member States to take advantage
of the DCR or remaining in Italy and renewing their focus in
renewable energy generation.76
If the prospective WTO Panel determines that the Italian FIT DCR
constitutes a TRIM, it will likely analyze Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement in making its determination.77 According to Article 2.1,
no WTO Member may apply any TRIM that violates Article III of
the GATT 1994.78 Under the national treatment obligation of Article
TRIMs Agreement, the FIT DCR requires the purchase of domestic goods over
imported goods to obtain an advantage).
72. See id. (arguing that under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement,
the Italian FIT Program constitutes a prohibited subsidy that favors the use of
domestic over imported goods).
73. TRIMs Agreement art. 1.
74. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.109–7.110
(noting that the Ontario FIT Program encouraged investment in the local
production of renewable-energy-generation components and motivated
manufacturers to build local facilities for the production of such components).
75. See id. (finding that the DCR in the Ontario FIT Program constituted a
TRIM because it favored Ontario-made components over imported ones, and WTO
jurisprudence has found that DCRs always favor the use of domestic products over
imported products, thereby affecting trade).
76. See id. ¶ 7.110 (citing contract documents, movement of companies to
Ontario, and prior WTO jurisprudence as evidence that the Ontario FIT DCR
favored the use of domestic products over imported products).
77. See id. ¶ 7.112 (moving to an analysis of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 after
concluding that the Ontario DCR constituted a TRIM).
78. TRIMs Agreement art. 2.1. See generally GATT 1994, art. III:4
(describing the national treatment obligation as the mandate that foreign products
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III:4, a solar-PV component imported from abroad must receive
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to “like [EU solar-PVcomponent] products” with respect to all available incentives.79
To support its analysis of Article 2.1, the prospective WTO Panel
will likely evaluate Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement to
determine whether the Italian FIT DCR violates both the national
treatment obligation in the GATT 1994 and the obligations within
the TRIMs Agreement. Article 2.2 indicates that the Annex to the
TRIMs Agreement provides an Illustrative List of TRIMs that also
violate the national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994.80 Under Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List, the
TRIMs must require, inter alia, that an enterprise purchase or use
products either of domestic origin or from a domestic source.81 The
chapeau to the Illustrative List also defines as violative of the
national treatment obligation those TRIMs for which compliance “is
necessary to obtain an advantage” or those TRIMs that “are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic or administrative
rulings.”82
Applying the relevant provisions in the Illustrative List to the facts
in the present dispute, the Panel would have to determine whether the
price advantage for solar-PV generators under the Italian FIT DCR is
contingent upon sourcing components from the European Union or
the European Economic Area. If the DCR maintains this sourcing
requirement, then the Panel would likely find that the FIT DCR
provides a preferential advantage to solar-PV component producers
that violates both the national treatment obligation of Article III:4 of
be accorded “treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use”).
79. See Wilke, supra note 11, at 10 (recognizing the argument that
“governmentally imposed FIT-linked local content requirements pose an incentive
to purchase locally produced goods to profit from the programme,” thereby
unfairly discriminating against domestic products).
80. TRIMs Agreement art. 2.2; see Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra
note 11, ¶¶ 7.119–7.120 (stating that when a measure violates the national
treatment obligation in Article III:4, and the measure has the traits described in
Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List in Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement, the
same measure will violate both Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of
the TRIMs Agreement).
81. TRIMs Agreement Annex, para. 1(a).
82. Id. Annex, para. 1.
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the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.83 Under
the national treatment obligation, the FIT DCR would provide less
favorable treatment to imported components than to like components
of European origin, and under the TRIMs Agreement, the FIT DCR
would upset the competitive relationship between European
components and imported components.84
In its complexity, the analysis that the Panel adopts from Canada
– Measures goes beyond the traditional analysis undertaken in
Article III:4 cases because it assesses violations of the national
treatment obligation through the lens of the Illustrative List in Annex
1 to the TRIMs Agreement.85 Normally, the Panel would need to
determine whether domestic and imported products are “like
products” in an analysis of Article III:4; however, as the panel
recognized in Canada – Measures, domestic and imported products
may be treated as “like products” where the origin of the products is
the only differentiating factor.86 Furthermore, through its Illustrative
83. Cf. Lee, supra note 47, at 62 (stating that Article III aims to protect the
expectations of WTO Members in a competitive relationship between imported
products and like products of national origin, and that incentives or advantages
granted to like products of national origin would upset that competitive
relationship).
84. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.155–7.157
(stating that if the Ontario FIT Program’s “Minimum Required Domestic Content
Level” requires electricity generators to use renewable energy generation
components of Canadian origin and is necessary to obtain an advantage under the
TRIMs Agreement, it will also violate Article III:4 of the GATT 1994).
85. Compare Srikar, supra note 9, at 41 (stating that in an analysis of a
measure’s consistency with Article III:4, WTO panels have looked to (1) whether
the imported products affected by the measure are “like” products of national
origin; and (2) whether the regulatory distinction between the two products results
in less favorable treatment of imports), and Lee, supra note 47, at 63 (endorsing
the “like products” test as the proper methodology for determining whether the
DCR of the Ontario FIT Program violated Article III:4 of the GATT 1994), with
Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.157 (resorting to the
language of the Illustrative List to determine (i) whether the domestic content
requirement applied under the FIT Program requires electricity generators using
solar-PV and wind power technology to purchase or use renewable energy
generation components sourced within Canada; and (ii) whether compliance with
the domestic content requirement is necessary to obtain an “advantage”).
86. Lee, supra note 47, at 64 (citing Panel Report, India - Measures Affecting
the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001)); cf.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Containing Asbestos, ¶ 101, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (noting that
several panels and the Appellate Body have outlined four general criteria to
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List in Paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement, the TRIMs
Agreement provides a list of the types of measures that would
provide less favorable treatment to imported products than to
domestic products under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 87 As a
result, panels have the discretion to determine that a separate analysis
of the DCR under Article III:4 is unnecessary after initially
examining Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement.88
consider in tandem when analyzing the “likeness” of domestic and imported
products: the properties, nature, and quality of the products; the end-uses of the
products; consumers’ tastes and habits; and, the tariff classification of the
products).
87. See Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, ¶
7.157, WT/DS146/R (Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter India Automotive Sector Panel
Report] (acknowledging that the TRIMs Agreement, through its Illustrative List,
both provides additional guidance on the identification of certain measures deemed
to be inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and introduces rights and
obligations that are specific to it, through its notification mechanism and related
provisions); see also Chapter 8: Trade-Related Investment Measures, JAPANESE
MINISTRY
OF
ECON.,
TRADE
AND
INDUS.,
available
at
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/gCT9908e.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2013) (noting that examples of TRIMs restrictions include local content
requirements, manufacturing requirements, trade-balancing requirements,
domestic-sales requirements, technology-transfer requirements, exportperformance requirements, local equity restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions,
remittance restrictions, licensing requirements, and employment restrictions).
88. See, e.g., Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶¶
5.93–5.95 (finding that a secondary analysis under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994
would only be necessary where the panel provided a “partial resolution of the
matter at issue,” or that an additional finding with respect to a stand-alone Article
III:4 claim “is necessary so as to allow for prompt compliance” or would compel
the panel to request different types of relief); Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, ¶ 14.93, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998)
[hereinafter Indonesia – Automobile Industry Panel Report] (finding, pursuant to
principles of judicial economy, that the Panel may address claims related to the
local content requirement under the TRIMs Agreement without analyzing Article
III:4 of the GATT 1994 because (1) any local content requirement that is
inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement would also violate the national treatment
obligation of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994; (2) the TRIMs Agreement is more
specific than Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 with respect to violations of local
content requirements; and (3) any action taken to remedy the inconsistencies of the
local content requirement under the TRIMs Agreement would also remedy its
inconsistencies with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994). But see, e.g., Panel Report,
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, ¶¶ 10.63–10.64,
WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000) (opting to examine under Article
III:4 of the GATT 1994 a measure mandating that automobiles manufactured in
Canada contain certain levels of Canadian value added after finding that the
TRIMs Agreement is not more specific than Article III:4 regarding the claims of
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Prior to addressing whether the DCR violates Article 2.1 of the
TRIMs Agreement, the Panel must first address the exception
provided in Article III:8(a) of GATT 1994.89 If the DCR meets that
exception, the WTO will likely excuse violations of Article III of the
GATT 1994, and by extension, Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement.90
2. Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994
According to Article III:8(a), the provisions of Article III of the
GATT 1994 do not apply to “laws, regulations or requirements
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods
for commercial sale.”91 In Canada – Measures, the panel engaged in
a three-step analysis of Article III:8(a) to determine whether a DCR
in the Ontario FIT Program constituted government procurement,
and it held that the program did not fall within the governmentprocurement exception.92
For the prospective WTO Panel to undertake the same analysis, it

discrimination asserted by complainants); India Automotive Sector Panel Report,
supra note 87, ¶ 7.157 (choosing to apply Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 to the
Indian trade-related investment measures after finding that the TRIMs Agreement
was not necessarily more specific than Article III:4, as it may simply provide
additional guidance as to which measures are inconsistent with Article III:4).
89. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.114, 7.118
(noting that government procurement transactions covered by the terms of Article
III:8(a) will be consistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement because
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement refers to the “provisions of Article III,” which
include Article III:8(a)).
90. See id. ¶ 7.118 (clarifying that any government procurement transactions
covered by the terms of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 will be excepted from
the obligations set forth both in Article III, which includes Article III:4, and Article
2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement).
91. GATT 1994 art. III:8(a); cf. Wilke, supra note 11, at 12 (opining that
governments may discriminate against WTO Members notwithstanding the TRIMs
Agreement and Article III of GATT 1994 if FITs constitute “government
procurement”).
92. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.122–7.124,
7.129, 7.146–7.147 (asking whether (1) the DCR may be characterized as a
measure governing procurement; (2) the challenged measure involved procurement
by governmental agencies; and (3) the governmental agencies undertook the
procurement for governmental purposes and not for commercial resale).

2014]

HEATED SKIRMISHES IN THE SOLAR SECTOR

693

must first specify which products will be subject to government
procurement and the nature of the market relationship between those
products. In a case where the Panel compares two sets of products—
namely solar-PV generation equipment and electricity—those
products must have a competitive relationship in the relevant
market.93 Here, the solar-PV generation equipment is the product of
foreign origin against which Italy has discriminated in its DCR, and
electricity is the product that the Italian Government will attempt to
procure.94 Absent a competitive relationship between these two
products, the discrimination against generation equipment contained
in the FIT Program would not fall within the scope of Article III:8(a)
of the GATT 1994.95 In such a case, the Panel would return to an
analysis of Article 2.1, Article 2.2, and Paragraph 1(a) of the Annex
to the TRIMs Agreement.96
3. Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement
In its complaint before the WTO, China also has alleged that the
Italian FIT Program violates Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement as a prohibited subsidy.97 Before China may resort to
Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2, however, it must first establish the existence
of a subsidy.98 Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement provides that
93. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5.76,
5.79 (emphasizing that the relationship between the product of foreign origin that
is the target of discrimination (renewable energy generation equipment) and the
product purchased by the Ontario Government (electricity) must be competitive,
not merely close as the Panel Report suggested).
94. See id. ¶¶ 5.79–5.84 (noting the difference between the product subject to
the Ontario DCR—the renewable energy generation equipment—and the product
procured by the Ontario government—electricity).
95. See id. ¶¶ 5.78–5.84 (reversing the panel’s findings that a DCR is a law,
regulation, or requirement governing the procurement by governmental agencies of
electricity under Article III:8(a) because the product of foreign origin that is the
subject of discrimination and the product purchased must have a competitive
relationship).
96. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.155 (moving to
an analysis of the compatibility of the “Minimum Required Domestic Content
Level” with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 subject to the obligations in Articles
2.1 and 2.2 and the Illustrative List in the TRIMs Agreement after finding that the
DCR failed to meet the criteria in Article III:8(a)).
97. See Consultations, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that the FIT Program
satisfies the definition of a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement
because it is contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods).
98. See id. (claiming that the FIT measures that violate Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2
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a subsidy exists where a government or public body makes a
financial contribution within the territory of a Member State such
that, inter alia, the government purchases goods.99 Additionally,
pursuant to Article 1.1(b), the financial contribution must also confer
a “benefit” upon the recipient.100 A “benefit” exists in the context of
Article 1.1(b) when it provides an advantage to its recipient; the
existence of any quantifiable advantage is determined by “comparing
the position of the recipient in the marketplace with and without the
financial contribution.”101 To provide context for Article 1.1(b),102 the
Panel likely would look to Article 14(d) of the SCM Agreement,
which provides that measures governing the purchase of goods do
not constitute a “benefit” unless the purchase of the goods is made
for more than adequate remuneration.103 Indeed, previous WTO
panels have determined that a financial contribution will confer a
“benefit” only where the government provides it on more favorable
terms than those available to the recipient in the market.104

of the SCM Agreement are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1). See
generally SCM Agreement art. 1.1 (outlining the conditions in which a financial
contribution constitutes a subsidy and confers a benefit).
99. SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (stating that a subsidy is deemed to exist
where the government, either in its own capacity or through another agency,
purchases goods).
100. Id. art. 1.1(b).
101. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.148.
102. See id. ¶¶ 5.163, 5.165 (concurring with the panel’s choice to read Article
14(d) for useful context for the interpretation of “benefit” under Article 1.1(b),
even though Article 14(d) is in Part V of the SCM Agreement).
103. SCM Agreement art. 14(d) (stating that the governmental purchase of
goods does not confer a “benefit” unless the purchase is made for more than
adequate remuneration, determined in light of marketability, prevailing market
conditions for the good in the country, and price conditions); see also Canada –
Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.271–7.272 (explaining the legal
significance of Article 14(d)).
104. E.g., Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, ¶ 9.112, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Canada – Civilian
Aircraft Panel Report] (reasoning that a financial contribution confers a “benefit”
only if provided on terms more advantageous than otherwise available in the open
market); Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft – Second Complaint, ¶ 7.475, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) (finding it
“well-established” that to confer a “benefit” within the meaning of Article 1.1(b)
of the SCM agreement, the terms of the financial contribution must be more
favorable than those otherwise generally available).
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4. Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement
Provided that China can prove the existence of a subsidy, the
WTO Panel would then turn to an analysis of Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2.
Under Article 3.1(b), subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic
over imported goods are strictly prohibited.105 Article 3.2 simply
reiterates this rule as a cornerstone of the SCM Agreement.106 Under
the force of these two articles, the SCM Agreement regulates
subsidies to ensure that they do not create adverse effects in the
markets of WTO Member States.107 Indeed, previous panels have
stated that the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is to curtail
specifically those subsidies that are designed to distort international
trade.108 Therefore, an FIT would likely constitute a subsidy program
under Articles 1.1(b) and 14(d) if it provides for the sale of solarbased electricity terms that are more favorable than those present in
the market.109 To determine whether the terms granted in the FIT
Program are more favorable, the Panel must find an appropriate
benchmark within the market with which to compare the FIT
Program.110

105. See SCM Agreement art. 3.1(b).
106. Id. art. 3.2 (stating that no Member shall grant or maintain prohibited
subsidies).
107. Id. arts. 5–6; see also Wilke, supra note 11, at 9 (indicating that adverse
effects exist for purposes of Article 5 of the SCM Agreement in the following
scenarios: (i) injury to the domestic industry of a WTO Member State; (ii)
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other
members; or (iii) serious prejudice to the interests of another member).
108. E.g., Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints
as Subsidies, ¶ 8.63, WT/DS194/R (June 29, 2001); Panel Report, Brazil – Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 7.26, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Canada –
Civilian Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶ 9.119.
109. See Vidhi R. Shah, Comment, The Allocation of Free Emissions
Allowances by Germany to Its Steel Industry: A Possible Subsidy Claim Under the
W.T.O. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 22 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 445, 463–64 (2007) (noting that when a financial contribution provides a
“benefit,” it distorts trade, and a panel will identify this distortion by determining
whether the industry received the financial contribution on terms more favorable
than those available to the recipient in the market).
110. Id. at 465 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the
Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 149–61, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999)) (restating
the Appellate Body’s view that “the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for
comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’”).
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III. ANALYSIS
If a WTO panel is established, it would likely find that the Italian
FIT DCR violates the TRIMs Agreement because it requires that
owners of solar-PV generators purchase or use components from the
European Union or the European Economic Area to become eligible
for an advantage that is otherwise unavailable to them.111 Italy likely
will claim that its FIT DCR qualifies as government procurement
under Article III:8(a), but because the product procured (solar-based
electricity) does not maintain a competitive relationship with the
products subject to discrimination (solar-PV generation equipment),
Article III:8(a) likely will not exempt the Italian FIT DCR from
scrutiny under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the
TRIMs Agreement.112 Even though the Panel might find that the FIT
DCR violates the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement and the GATT
1994, the Italian FIT Program may not violate the SCM Agreement
because it does not necessarily confer a “benefit” upon solar-PV
generators.113

A. TRIMS AGREEMENT AND GATT 1994
1. The DCR Within the Italian FIT Program Constitutes a TRIM
Under Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement
As stated previously, the WTO defines a TRIM as an investment
measure related to trade in goods only.114 When analyzing the DCR
most analogous to that in the Italian FIT Program, the panel in
Canada – Measures found that the Ontario FIT Program affected
trade in the local production of renewable-energy-generation
components by overtly favoring Ontario products over imported
111. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining that the DCR within the FIT
Program constitutes a regulation that solar-PV generation companies that purchase
components manufactured in either the European Union or the European Economic
Area will receive an increase in the sale price of electricity and, because this
regulation does not extend to like imports, it provides an advantage to Europeanbased components).
112. See discussion infra Part III.B.
113. See id. (postulating that, under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the
Italian FIT Program may not confer a “benefit” upon solar-PV generators because
tariff degression and other measures will bring solar-PV generators to grid-parity
in the near future).
114. TRIMs Agreement art. 1.
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ones.115 To this extent, several companies either built or planned to
build manufacturing plants in Ontario to take advantage of its FIT
Program.116
Much like the Ontario FIT Program, the Italian FIT Program
encourages significant investment in the local production of solar-PV
generator components.117 At least some manufacturers in Italy have
renewed their focus on the production of renewable energy
technologies,118 and some have built generators, either in Italy or
other EU Member States, to take advantage of the price increase
available to manufacturers that source components domestically. 119
Because the Italian FIT DCR encourages investment in the local
production of solar-PV components, it is also a TRIM under Article
1 of the TRIMs Agreement.120
115. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.111 (recalling the
Panel’s earlier decision in Indonesia – Automobile Industry, where it held that
DCRs, by design and definition, always favor domestic products over imported
products, which impacts trade); cf. Lee, supra note 47, at 59 (stating that the OPA
included the DCR so that Ontario manufacturers would be able to participate in the
economic benefits flowing from the program).
116. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.110 (noting that
Siemens has become a local manufacturer in Ontario and that ENERCON will
build a manufacturing plant in Ontario).
117. See Solar Power, supra note 26 (announcing a venture between Enel
Green Power, Sharp, and STMicroelectronics that includes the manufacture of
solar-PV panels at the largest PV production plant at a national level, one of the
largest of its kind in Europe); cf. Indonesia – Automobile Industry Panel Report,
supra note 88, ¶ 6.4 (finding that Indonesian car programs constitute investment
measures because they have plainly stated investment objectives aimed at
encouraging the development of local manufacturing capability for completed
motor vehicles, car parts, and car components in Indonesia, and have had a
significant impact on investment in the automobile manufacturing sector).
118. See Solar Power, supra note 26 (reporting that Enel Green Power and
Sharp Solar Energy have agreed to develop, build, and manage solar-PV plants in
Europe using the panels manufactured in Catania, Italy).
119. See, e.g., SunPower Builds Italy’s Largest Solar Power Plant in Montalto
di
Castro,
SUNPOWER,
http://us.sunpowercorp.com/power-plant/successstories/development-approach/?relType=SP_Content_C&relID=1293430111928
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (announcing that SunRay constructed the largest solarPV plant in Italy to date); First Solar ‘Made in EU’ Stamp Comes with Discount,
CNET (Sept. 1, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-20100430-54/firstsolar-made-in-eu-stamp-comes-with-discount/ (reporting that First Solar has
received the right to use “Made in EU” or “Made in Europe” on its thin-film solar
panels made in Germany).
120. See Indonesia – Automobile Industry Panel Report, supra note 88, ¶¶
14.82–14.83 (stating that the local content requirements affect trade because local
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Before proceeding to an analysis of Articles 2.1 and 2.2, however,
the Panel will need to determine whether the DCR qualifies for the
government-procurement exception under Article III:8(a) of the
GATT 1994.121
2. The DCR in the Italian FIT Program Does Not Qualify for the
Exception in Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994
For the Italian FIT DCR to qualify for the exception in Article
III:8(a), the Panel would have to find that the product of foreign
origin against which the DCR discriminates (solar-PV generation
equipment) maintains a competitive market relationship with the
product procured by the Italian Government (solar-based
electricity).122 Without this competitive relationship, the DCR will
not fall within the scope of Article III:8(a), and it likely will violate
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs
Agreement.123
Like the generation equipment against which the Ontario DCR
discriminated, the generation equipment against which the Italian
DCR discriminates does not maintain a competitive relationship with
the electricity procured by the Italian Government. In Canada –
Measures, the panel found that the Ontario DCR was a “necessary
condition and prerequisite” governing the procurement of electricity
because the Ontario Government purchased the electricity, produced
by renewable energy generators under the FIT Program, only if sixty
percent of the components used in the generators were sourced from
content requirements, by definition, always affect trade and favor the use of
domestic products over imported products).
121. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.122 (undertaking
an analysis of Article III:8(a) of GATT 1994 before reaching Articles 2.1 and 2.2
and Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement).
122. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.79
(“We have found above that the conditions for derogation under Article III:8(a)
must be understood in relation to the obligation stipulated in the other paragraphs
of Article III. This means that the product of foreign origin allegedly being
discriminated against must be in a competitive relationship with the product
purchased.”).
123. See id. (overturning panel findings that the Ontario DCR constitutes a law,
regulation, or requirement governing the procurement by governmental agencies of
electricity under Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994 because the generation
equipment receiving discrimination did not have a competitive relationship with
the electricity procured by the Ontario Government).
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Ontario.124 The generation equipment was “needed and used” to
produce the electricity, and consequently, the generation equipment
subject to the DCR and the electricity procured by the Ontario
Government had a close relationship, which the panel deemed
necessary for the DCR to be considered a requirement that governed
the procurement of electricity.125
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body overturned the panel’s finding
and held that the Ontario FIT DCR did not constitute a law,
regulation, or requirement “governing the procurement by
governmental agencies’ of electricity within the meaning of Article
III:8(a)” because the discrimination relating to generation equipment
contained in the FIT Program was not covered under Article
III:8(a).126 The Appellate Body stressed that the Ontario FIT DCR
discriminated against the generation equipment used to produce the
electricity, not the electricity itself, which was the target of the
Ontario Government’s procurement.127 Given this distinction, the
generation equipment against which the Ontario FIT DCR
discriminated was required to have a competitive relationship—not
simply a close relationship—with the electricity procured by the
Ontario Government.128 In Canada – Measures, the generation
equipment subject to discrimination by the Ontario DCR did not
have a competitive relationship with the electricity procured by the
Ontario Government within the local market because the generation
equipment and the electricity did not compete in the same market. 129
With no competitive relationship between the electricity and the
generation equipment, the Ontario FIT DCR failed to qualify for the
exception under Article III:8(a).
Unlike the Ontario DCR, the Italian DCR does not require that
solar-PV generators use domestically-sourced renewable-energy124. Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165.
125. See id. ¶ 7.127 (stating that there is a close relationship between the
products that are affected by the relevant “laws, regulations or requirements”—
renewable energy generation equipment—and the product that is allegedly
procured—electricity).
126. Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.79.
127. Id. (“In the case before us, the product being procured is electricity,
whereas the product discriminated against for reason of its origin is generation
equipment.”).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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generation equipment to be involved in the FIT Program. 130 Instead,
the Italian DCR requires simply that solar-PV generators use
domestically-sourced equipment (from either the European Union or
the European Economic Area) to qualify for an increase in the sale
price of electricity that they produce.131 Because the DCR is not a
prerequisite for compliance with the FIT Program, the generation
equipment that it targets certainly does not compete with the
electricity procured, let alone hold a close relationship with that
electricity. As a result, the Panel is even less likely to identify the
Italian FIT DCR as a law, regulation, or requirement governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of electricity within the
meaning of Article III:8(a). The DCR will likely fail to meet the first
prong of the analysis under Article III:8(a), and as a result, the Panel
will likely continue with its analysis of Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the
TRIMs Agreement.
3. The DCR in the Italian FIT Program Is Inconsistent with Article
2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement
If the Italian FIT DCR shares the traits elaborated in Paragraph
1(a) of the Illustrative List and the chapeau to the Paragraph, it also
will be inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and
the national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT
1994. The Panel would have to determine whether the DCR requires
the purchase or use of products from a domestic source and whether
compliance with the DCR is necessary to obtain an advantage.132
First, the Panel would likely find that the Italian FIT DCR requires
the purchase or use of products from a domestic source.133 In Canada
130. Compare Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.158, 7.163
(stating that the solar-PV and wind-power generators must be comprised of a
certain percentage of components sourced within Ontario to participate in the
Ontario FIT Program), with D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d), and D.M. n.
143/2012, art. 4(5)(d) (establishing favorable purchase prices for solar-PV units
with a certain percentage of parts sourced from within the European Union or the
Eurepean Economic Area).
131. E.g., D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d); D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 4(5)(d).
132. Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.157.
133. See id. ¶ 7.163 (finding that the Ontario FIT DCR required the purchase or
use of products sourced from Ontario to guarantee that electricity generated by
solar-PV and wind plants would be purchased at the price guaranteed in the
Ontario FIT Program).
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– Measures, the panel determined that solar-PV generators must
source sixty percent of their components from Ontario to satisfy the
DCR within the Ontario FIT Program.134 Because the Ontario FIT
Program mandated that renewable energy generators purchase or use
a certain percentage of renewable-energy-generation components
sourced from Ontario, the Ontario FIT Program required the use of
components from a domestic source as described in Paragraph 1(a)
of the Illustrative List.135
Like the Ontario FIT DCR, the Italian FIT DCR requires the
purchase or use of products from a domestic source, namely Italy or
another EU/EEA Member State.136 The Fourth Energy Bill mandates
that solar-PV generators meet a sixty-percent threshold of EU/EEAsourced components to earn a ten-percent increase in the sale price of
electricity,137 while the Fifth Energy Bill requires that the modules or
inverters within the generators be manufactured within the European
Union or European Economic Area to earn the price increase.138
Because the Fourth and Fifth Energy Bills both require the use of
components from domestic sources, the Italian FIT DCR satisfies the
first element of Paragraph 1(a) of the TRIMs Agreement.
Next, the Panel likely would find that compliance with the DCR in
the Italian FIT Program is necessary to obtain an advantage. 139 In
Canada – Measures, the panel found that compliance with the
Ontario FIT DCR guaranteed that solar-PV and wind-power

134. See id. ¶ 7.158 (listing the content requirements for solar-PV FIT
generators and solar-PV microFIT generators).
135. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.164–7.165
(finding that because the generators must use at least some components from
Ontario to be eligible for the FIT Program, the DCR requires use of components
from a domestic source). See generally TRIMs Agreement Annex, para. 1(a)
(stating that TRIMs are inconsistent with the national treatment obligation in
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 if they require purchase or use by an enterprise of
products of a domestic origin or source).
136. See, e.g., D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d); D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 4(5)(d).
137. D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d).
138. D.M. n. 143/2012, arts. 2(1)(v), 4(5)(d), 5(2)(a).
139. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165 (finding that
compliance with the DCR was necessary to qualify for the guaranteed FIT rate in
the Ontario FIT Program). See generally TRIMs Agreement Annex, para. 1(a)
(stating that TRIMs are also inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment
in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 if compliance with the TRIM is necessary to
obtain an advantage).
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generators would receive a fixed price for any electricity they
produced.140 In turn, the sale of electricity at the guaranteed price
generated a healthy return on investment in generators using
components sourced from Ontario.141 Moreover, failure to comply
with the terms of the Ontario FIT DCR placed FIT generators in
default of their contractual obligations.142 Because compliance with
the DCR guaranteed participation in the Ontario FIT Program, it
provided an advantage as stated in Paragraph 1(a) of the Illustrative
List.
The Italian FIT DCR likely provides solar-PV generators with an
advantage because it grants a price increase to those generators that
use domestically-sourced components over components sourced
from abroad.143 This price increase constitutes a preferential
advantage because generators that fail to meet the DCR threshold
will not be able to sell their solar-PV-based electricity at comparable
prices.144 As a result, the DCR impedes the sale of like solar-PV
components from non-EU Member States in the Italian market and
disrupts their competitive relationship in the solar-PV-component
market.145 The DCR meets the requirements set forth in Paragraph
140. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165 (finding that
compliance with the DCR was a precondition for electricity generators to
participate in the FIT Program).
141. Id.; see Lee, supra note 47, at 59 (explaining that the FIT rates were
designed to cover the capital and operating costs of a project while providing a
reasonable rate of return on a project developer’s investment over the twenty-year
term).
142. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.165 (stating that
if a failure to comply with a contractual obligation nullifies the contract, the
fulfillment of that obligation is a necessary condition to receive the benefit).
143. See Lee, supra note 47, at 67 (“The Panel in Canada – Autos found that
such a measure, which provides that an advantage can be obtained by using
domestic products but not by using imported products, had an ‘impact on the
conditions of competition between imported and domestic products,’ thus the
measure ‘affected’ the sale of the imported products.”).
144. See, e.g., D.M. n. 238/2011, art. 14(1)(d); D.M. n. 143/2012, art. 4(5)(d)
(increasing the sale price of electricity in the Italian market so long as a certain
percentage of components used in solar-PV generators are EU/EEA sourced).
145. Cf. Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural
Machinery, ¶¶ 5, 22, 25, L/833 – 7S/60 (July 15, 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 2, 5–6 (1958) (providing that a measure granting more favorable terms
and credit facilities to purchases of Italian goods than to purchases of non-Italian
goods influenced purchasers to buy Italian goods, which resulted in a violation of
Article III:4 of GATT 1994).
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1(a) of the Illustrative List and the chapeau to the Paragraph, and as a
result, violates both Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and the
national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.

B. SCM AGREEMENT
Despite the finding that the FIT Program constitutes a financial
contribution to Italian solar-PV generators, the Panel may not find
that the Italian FIT Program constitutes a subsidy under Article 1.1
of the SCM Agreement. With its public utilities, the Italian
Government provides a financial contribution to solar-PV generators
by procuring the electricity that the generators produce, 146 an
arrangement that constitutes the purchase of a good under Article
1.1(a)(1)(iii).147 Nevertheless, the Italian FIT Program may not
confer a “benefit” upon the recipients of the financial contribution in
the context of Article 1.1(b),148 despite generous tariffs and high
levels of insolation, which have allowed the solar-PV sector to grow
significantly.149 As this comment demonstrates, tariff degression
continues to pare down the costs of the FIT significantly, and the
Italian government is downsizing its FIT Program now that it nearly
has reached grid-parity with fossil-fuel resources.150
1. The Italian FIT Program Satisfies Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM
Agreement
In order for the Panel to find that the Italian FIT Program
constitutes a prohibited subsidy, it must first determine whether,
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement, the FIT Program
146. See Simone Monesi, Italy, in THE ENERGY REGULATION AND MARKETS
REVIEW 146, 149 (David L. Schwartz ed., 2012) (identifying ENEL, Terna SpA,
ENEL Distribuzione, and GME—all publicly-owned Italian companies—as the
parties responsible for generating electricity, dispatching it to transmission grids,
operating grids, selling electricity, and managing trades in the market,
respectively).
147. See generally SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (providing that a subsidy
exists if a government or public body provides a financial contribution, inter alia,
by purchasing goods).
148. See id. art. 1.1(b).
149. See Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (emphasizing that Italian
tariffs remain fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs with Italy’s
high levels of sunshine).
150. See Fulton et al., supra note 44 (identifying grid-parity as a realizable goal
given the gradual and transparent nature of degression).
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provides a financial contribution to solar-PV generators via the
Italian public utility, GSE, which purchases solar-based electricity.151
A government or public body provides a financial contribution when,
inter alia, it purchases and obtains possession of goods.152
In both the Ontario and Italian FIT Programs, procurement of
electricity fits the definition of a purchase of a good by a
governmental agent. The Panel in Canada – Measures found that
Hydro One, the publicly-owned electricity retailer, ably met the
description of a governmental agent, as the Government of Ontario
had imposed a duty on Hydro One both to operate generation
facilities and distribution systems and to dispatch electricity to
communities within Ontario.153 As the OPA supplied electricity into
the grid,154 Hydro One transmitted and distributed that electricity to
retail customers under the direction of the FIT Program.155 For these
151. See Statuto del “Gestore dei Servizi Energetici – GSE S.p.A.” (adopted
pursuant to Decreto Legislativo 16 marzo 1999, n. 79 (It.)), available at
http://www.gse.it/it/Azienda/GSE_Documenti/Azienda/Missione/Documenti/Mode
llo%20organizzativo/Statuto_GSE2010.pdf
(identifying
the
roles
and
responsibilities of GSE in the Italian FIT Program); see also RainChief Energy
Business Summary, RAINCHIEF RENEWABLE ENERGY 1 (Dec. 2010),
http://stocksjournal.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/RCFEF.pdf
[hereinafter RainChief Energy Business Summary] (stating that GSE, as the Italian
Government’s national power authority, establishes FIT rates and pays the rates on
the basis of kW hours of electricity power delivered into the grid).
152. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶ 7.233 (citing
Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China),
¶¶ 317–18, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter US – AD/CVD (China)]
(stating that where a statute or other legal instrument fails to vest authority in the
entity concerned, that entity constitutes a “public body” if it is vested with
governmental authority and exercises governmental functions). See generally SCM
Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (stating that a financial contribution is deemed to exist
when a government purchases goods).
153. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.234–7.235
(finding that the Government of Ontario had meaningful control over Hydro One,
as the utility (1) was established by the government; (2) remained accountable to
the government; (3) had its delegates appointed by the government; (4) has had
authority assigned to it; and (5) had several arrangements as a Crown Corporation
of the Government of Ontario).
154. See id. ¶ 7.239 (highlighting that the OPA paid the FIT rates while Hydro
One controlled the flow of electricity through the grid).
155. See id. (noting that Hydro One owns and operates ninety-seven percent of
the transmission lines and distributes electricity to 1.3 million customers,
suggesting that the Government of Ontario purchases the electricity delivered into
the grid under the FIT Program).
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reasons, the Panel found that, through its FIT Program, the
Government of Ontario purchased electricity as required for a
subsidy under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement.
In the present case, all of the Italian utilities at issue—the utility
company (GSE), the electricity retailer (Enel Green Power), and the
Italian grid operator (Terna Rete Italia)—are publicly-owned
entities.156 Like the OPA, GSE purchases electricity from renewableenergy-generation plants and trades that electricity on the market. 157
Moreover, in the same way that Hydro One distributed electricity in
the interest of the Ontario Government, Enel and Terna operate
generation facilities and distribute electricity, respectively, in the
interest of the Italian Government.158 As a result, the Panel likely will
find that the Italian Government, through its FIT Program, purchases
electricity as required for a subsidy under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the
SCM Agreement.
2. The Italian FIT Program Does Not Satisfy Article 1.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement
After determining that the Italian FIT Program constitutes a
financial contribution in which the government purchases goods, the
Panel may not find that the purchase guarantee in the Italian FIT
Program confers a “benefit” to solar-PV generators under Article
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. In its analysis of Article 1.1(b), the
Panel would likely resort to Article 14(d), which states that a
government’s purchase of goods shall not confer a “benefit” unless
made for more than adequate remuneration.159
156. See About Us, ENEL, supra note 25 (stating that the Italian Ministry of
Economy and Finance holds 31.24% of Enel’s shares); see also About Terna Rete
Italia, supra note 30; GSE S.p.A, supra note 27 (providing that the sole owner of
GSE is the Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”) and that the MEF exercises
its shareholder rights jointly with the Ministry of Economic Development). But see
US – AD/CVD (China), supra note 152, ¶¶ 317–18 (ruling that, absent additional
indicia that an entity is controlled by the government, the fact that a government is
the majority shareholder of an entity does not allow for an inference that the entity
is exercising governmental authority, and therefore, is a public body).
157. RainChief Energy Business Summary, supra note 151, at 1.
158. See Nela Lazarevic, The Big Three: Terna, CGES and Enel, BALKAN
INSIGHT (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/terna-cges-enel
(providing that the Italian Government controls Terna through its major
shareholder, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti).
159. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.271–7.278
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Notably, while the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding in
Canada – Measures that the Ontario FIT Program did not confer a
“benefit” under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, it was unable
to complete the panel’s analysis and make its own affirmative
determination as to whether the Ontario FIT Program conferred a
“benefit” upon renewable energy generation companies.160 This issue
is a particularly close one and likely will be revisited in future FIT
disputes. Therefore, this comment will explore Italy’s and China’s
prospective arguments in more detail and will review the likely
impact of the Canada – Measures decision on the Panel’s
deliberations in the case at bar.
Initially, Italy may argue that its FIT Program does not confer a
“benefit” upon solar-PV generation companies because the Italian
wholesale electricity market fails to secure the reliable, long-term
supply of solar-PV-generated electricity necessary for the
functioning of any economy. In what the panel in Canada –
Measures referred to as the “missing money problem,” private
investors in Ontario refused to finance construction of new
renewable energy generators when the price of electricity was low;
as a result, the wholesale electricity market in Ontario failed to create
the level of competition that would have attracted diverse types of
energy and allowed the market to meet future demand.161 In failing to
meet future demand, the Ontario Government also failed to meet the
consumption needs of its citizens, due not only to the generation
capacity lost from aging nuclear power plants,162 but also to recordhigh summer temperatures that had exhausted Ontario’s supply of
(stating that the Panel will likely measure such remuneration according to
wholesale market conditions). See generally SCM Agreement art. 14(d)
(establishing that adequate remuneration includes the market conditions for the
sale of the good, marketability, transportation, and market demand).
160. In the case at bar, publicly available data from out-of-country solar-PV
generation markets is scarce, which makes it difficult to establish a comparative
market benchmark. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note
11, ¶¶ 5.220, 5.224–5.228, 5.246 (finding that the Appellate Body could not
complete its legal analysis with respect to benefit benchmark comparisons between
the appropriate wind-generated electricity prices because the panel record did not
contain sufficient factual findings and uncontested evidence).
161. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.279, 7.283,
7.308 (noting that the “missing money problem” affects electricity produced from
all types of sources, not just renewable energy sources).
162. See id. ¶¶ 7.280, 7.286.
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electricity.163 In light of this recurring problem, the panel in Canada
– Measures stated that sovereign governments must be allowed to
provide incentives to secure a sustainable energy supply in new
electricity generation.164
Like the Ontario wholesale electricity market, the Italian
wholesale electricity market has failed to incentivize the mix of
energy sources needed (1) to create a reliable electricity system, (2)
to cover generation costs, and (3) to pursue human health and
environmental objectives.165 Italy demonstrates a significant need to
diversify its energy sources given both the size of its market and its
decision to phase out the use of nuclear power in the production of
electricity.166 As Ontario suffered an energy shortage in its reliance
upon outdated coal-powered plants,167 Italy must develop alternate
energy resources to replace its nuclear power plants.168
Despite Italy’s pursuit of laudable policy objectives, the
prospective Panel likely would proceed with its analysis of whether
the Italian FIT Program confers a “benefit” upon solar-PV
generators. Though the Italian Government would be justified in
following its human health and environmental policy objectives in its
production of electricity, the Appellate Body in Canada – Measures
163. See id. ¶¶ 7.287–7.288.
164. See id. ¶ 7.283 (recommending alternative mechanisms to wholesale spot
markets, such as power purchase agreements and capacity payments).
165. Cf. id. ¶ 7.280 (noting that a diverse mix of generation technology is
necessary to secure a reliable, clean electricity system and to serve technical,
economic, and environmental objectives); Fulton et al., supra note 44, at 2 (stating
that well-constructed FIT policies should incentivize renewable technologies to
reach the grid-parity target).
166. See Morris, supra note 18 (reporting that Italy is one of the largest national
economies to have rejected the use of nuclear power in the production of
electricity, demonstrating the great need to secure a diversified, reliable supply of
electricity).
167. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.65, 7.216, 7.223
(finding that the anticipated closure of coal-fired plants made Ontario increase
supply of electricity produced from renewable sources to diversify its supply-mix
and help replace the coal-fired facilities).
168. See Morris, supra note 18 (referencing a referendum where over fifty
percent of eligible Italian voters opposed construction of new nuclear power plants,
plans to privatize water supplies, and provision of amnesty to politicians such as
Berlusconi); see also Photovoltaic Barometer, supra note 15, at 59–61 (opining
that the country must develop its renewable energy resources now that Italians
have agreed to prevent new nuclear power plant reactors in a national referendum).
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held that such objectives ought not to preclude a market-based
analysis in the determination of “benefit.”169 Indeed, the Appellate
Body in Canada – Measures noted that such an interpretation would
“read an exception into Article 1.1(b) based on the rationale of the
subsidy that has no textual basis in the [SCM] Agreement.”170 Article
14(d) of the SCM Agreement states that a purchase of goods confers
a “benefit” if “the purchase is made for more than adequate
remuneration,” which would be analyzed according to “prevailing
market conditions.”171 The latter language suggests that the
determination of a “benefit” under Article 1.1(b) requires a
competitive market benchmark, for which the Panel may resort to a
second-country benchmark so long as it makes adjustments to
replicate competitive market conditions.172 Ideally, the proper
benchmark would comprise the Italian Government’s definition of
the energy supply mix, which would include solar-PV-generated
electricity, as well as a comparison of renewable-energy market
conditions in Italy and third-market countries.173
Given the stated need for a comparative market benchmark, China
might argue that the Italian solar-PV energy market, when compared
to surrounding markets, receives more than adequate remuneration
from its government for purchases of electricity. Indeed, the high
levels of insolation and the above-average base tariff rates in Italy
seem to indicate that the Italian solar-PV market receives more than
adequate remuneration for the electricity it produces.174 A FIT
169. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 5.182,
5.185–5.186 (noting that the panel’s definition of “the relevant market for a benefit
comparison as a single market for electricity generated from all sources of energy”
as a result of policy choices should not “prevent a market-based approach to the
determination of benefit” even though governments may reasonably intervene to
pursue policy goals and to ensure that there is “a continuous supply-demand
balance between generators and consumers”).
170. Id. ¶ 5.182.
171. SCM Agreement art. 14(d).
172. See Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.184
(referencing the Appellate Body’s determination in US – Softwood Lumber IV that
investigating authorities may use the price of the same or similar goods in a market
outside of the country—taking into account prevailing market conditions in the
country of provision with price, quality, and other indicators—where private prices
for particular government-provided goods are distorted because of the
government’s role in providing the goods).
173. Id. ¶ 5.204.
174. See Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (emphasizing that, as of 2011,
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structure arguably allows Italy to harness its insolation, and
consequently, the FIT would confer even more of a “benefit” for the
Italian solar-PV market than the Ontario FIT does for the Ontario
solar-PV market. Moreover, the Italian FIT covers costs of capital
and provides solar-PV generators with reasonable rates of return for
any electricity produced, creating a nearly risk-free environment for
solar-PV generators.175
Nevertheless, China’s argument concerning the high levels of
insolation and the above-market-value prices of electricity produced
by Italian solar-PV generators, by itself, may not convince the Panel
that the FIT provides a “benefit” to solar-PV generators if the Panel
takes into account the consistent downsizing of the Italian FIT
Program. Like the FIT rates in Ontario, the Italian FIT rates are
higher than average, though Italy has taken significant steps to
reduce its FITs such that the Italian Government is purchasing solarPV-based electricity at a tariff rate that increasingly approaches
market-level remuneration.176 In 2011, Italy’s Ministry of Industry
passed proposals that allowed the Italian Government to reduce FIT
rates by an average of eighteen percent.177 As solar-PV generation in
Italy grows rapidly and generation costs decline, the Italian
Government is increasingly adjusting regulation to moderate cost
inefficiencies and to account for oversupplies in electricity.178 The
oversupply of solar-PV-generated electricity has caused prices to fall
significantly in the Italian wholesale electricity market, resulting in

the tariffs remain fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs when
adjusted for Italy’s higher levels of solar energy).
175. See id. (noting that, as of July 9, 2011, Italy’s new tariffs were at least fifty
percent greater than the current tariffs in Germany); see also Paul Gipe, Italy
Abandons RPS, Adopts System of Feed-In Tariffs, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD
(Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/12/
italy-abandons-rps-adopts-system-of-feed-in-tariffs (noting that, despite the rapid
cuts in payment for solar-PV generation, the installation rate remains high).
176. See Fulton et al., supra note 44, at 8, 18 (updating proposals to reduce the
subsidies for FITs by approximately six percent per four-month period).
177. See id. at 18 (adding that the decline would be spread out across fourmonth periods, with six percent FIT declines in each period, translating to 2011
subsidies of €0.28/kWh for large-scale projects and €0.38/kWh for small-scale
applications).
178. See id. at 4 (stating that the Italian Government might adjust the tariff rates
as prices fall).
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significantly less profit for generators.179 Experts even indicate that
renewable energy sources in Italy are close to grid-parity with fossilfuel sources, positing that large-scale investments in solar-PVgenerated electricity are becoming increasingly unnecessary. 180 As
the Italian wholesale electricity market continues to evolve, investors
are looking toward smaller, more affordable solar-PV generators,
which are more efficient and less costly than ground-mounted, largescale generators.181 Ideally, the smaller, more efficient solar-PV
generators should drive down the base tariff rate at which solar-based
electricity is purchased in the wholesale market.
Italy recognizes the trajectory of its solar-PV energy market, and
in accordance with that trajectory, it is lowering its tariff rates
through various mechanisms to render its FIT Program more
efficient and much less remunerative in the marketplace. Prices
continue to fall for newly-installed solar-PV generators,182 and even
though generators already in operation will not be affected by price
degressions,183 the Italian Government has pared down its financial
179. See Christian Roselund, 2012 Solar PV Year in Review: A Complex
Picture of a Changing Market, SOLARSERVER (Jan. 20, 2013),
http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-report/solar-report/2012-solarpv-year-in-review-a-complex-picture-of-a-changing-market.html (reporting that
continuing global oversupply of solar-PV energy induced a collapse in PV prices,
leading to negative profit margins).
180. See Becky Stuart, The Rules of the Game, PV MAGAZINE (Mar. 2012),
http://www.pv-magazine.com/archive/articles/beitrag/the-rules-of-the-game_100005931/86/?tx_ttnews%5BbackCat%5D=196&cHash=cf2f8c76afe0f61deacc
7e9b0b8622c2 (stating that Italy—particularly southern Italy—may reach gridparity by 2013 because of lower component and procurement costs).
181. See id. (noting that the large-scale, ground-mounted plants are less of a
target for investment than rooftop systems in the retail and domestic markets
because of the potential return on investment); see also Italian Solar Generation,
supra note 17 (indicating that, in 2011, “one-third of Italy’s total solar capacity
was installed by homeowners, farmers, and small businesses,” and ninety-seven
percent of solar-PV systems used in Italy are less than 200 kW in size).
182. See Mario Ragwitz et al., Recent Developments of Feed-In Systems in the
EU: A Research Paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation, INT’L FEED-IN
COOPERATION 1, 9–10 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.feed-incooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/research/index.php (explaining that tariff
degressions can provide incentives for technology improvements and for cost
reductions); see also Klein et al., supra note 42, at 43 (stating that, in 2007, tariff
degression for Italian FITs for solar-PV plants amounted to reductions of two
percent annually).
183. See Ragwitz et al., supra note 182, at 9–10 (noting that price degressions
only affect newly-constructed solar-PV generators).
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support for renewable energy generation significantly as it tackles its
sovereign debt crisis.184 Seeking an alternative to its FIT Program,
Italy has instituted a net-metering program that allows its solar-PV
generators to consume at least some of the electricity that the
generators produce instead of feeding all of the electricity into the
grid, which reduces the base tariff according to the portion of
electricity that the generators consume.185 Recognizing that Italy will
invest less in renewable energy, some utility companies have moved
to implement projects in developing countries.186
Considering the shift in the Italian market toward smaller solar-PV
generators, the steps taken by the Italian Government to degress its
FITs, and the net-metering program that Italy has instituted, the
Panel may not find that the Italian FIT Program provides solar-PV
generators with more than adequate remuneration for their costs of
capital. As a result, the FIT Program would not confer a “benefit”
under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, and it would not
constitute a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the prospective WTO Panel finds that the Italian FIT DCR is
inconsistent with the obligations set forth in the TRIMs Agreement
and the GATT 1994, Italy should respond by using the avenues
established in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. First,
Italy should appeal the Panel’s adverse ruling to the Appellate Body,
which may overrule the Panel and find that the FIT DCR qualifies
184. See Mark Scott, In Europe, Green Energy Takes a Hit From Debt Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/business/energyenvironment/in-europe-green-energy-takes-a-hit-from-debt-crisis.html?_r=1&
(reporting that leading utilities and independent energy projects seek markets
abroad for renewable energy projects as European governments, overwhelmed by
debts, have cut subsidies from six billion euros in 2012 to five hundred million
euros in 2013).
185. See Ragwitz et al., supra note 182, at 11 (explaining that under the Italian
net-metering scheme, producers do not receive direct remuneration for excess
electricity fed into the grid, but rather an exchange of the value of electricity
already consumed); see also Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (explaining
that, in 2013, under the Fourth Conto Energia, any portion of the electricity that is
used to offset on-site consumption receives a reduced “net-metering” tariff).
186. See Scott, supra note 184 (noting that Enel Green Power has shifted its
focus to new markets in the developing world—like Brazil and South Africa—
after paring back its anticipated renewable energy projects in Europe).
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for the exception provided in Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.
Second, if the Appellate Body affirms the Panel Decision, Italy
should eliminate the DCR from its FIT Program to comply with its
obligations under the TRIMs Agreement and the GATT 1994. Last,
Italy should consider discontinuing its FIT Program altogether and
implementing another renewable energy program given Italy’s
current economic downturn and the weight of sovereign debt on
Italy’s budget.

A. ITALY SHOULD APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE BODY THE
OUTCOME OF THE PANEL DECISION
Under Articles 16.4, 17.4, and 17.6 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, parties to an original dispute may appeal to an
Appellate Body concerning the issues of law arising out of a Panel
Decision.187 As such, the Appellate Body may adopt the Panel’s
reasoning or strike it down as misapplied188 within at least two to
three months.189 Italy may wish to appeal its Panel Decision to the
Appellate Body; if it does, it will likely need to refute arguments
made by China that the FIT Program confers a “benefit” under
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. Given that Canada –
Measures is the first case in which either the panel or the Appellate
Body has interpreted Article III:8(a),190 Italy should request that the
Appellate Body support its interpretation of the term “products” and
the need for a competitive relationship between the products at issue,
as this interpretation is not grounded in any other portion of the
GATT 1994 or previous Panel or Appellate Body Reports. Italy also
should request that the Panel complete the three-step analysis
required as part of Article III:8(a) of the GATT 1994.191
187. See DSU arts. 16.4, 17.4, 17.6 (providing parties the right to appeal the
Panel Decision within sixty days but limiting the appeal to the legal issues covered
by the panel).
188. See id. art. 17.13 (establishing that the Appellate Body may uphold,
modify, or reverse the conclusions of the panel).
189. See id. art. 17.5 (providing that, as a general rule, the proceedings shall not
exceed sixty days unless the Appellate Body requires more time).
190. Canada – Measures Appellate Body Report, supra note 11, ¶ 5.54.
191. See Canada – Measures Panel Report, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.122–7.124,
7.129, 7.146–7.147 (asking whether (1) the DCR may be characterized as “laws,
regulations, or requirements governing procurement;” (2) the “challenged measure
involve[d] procurement by governmental agencies;” and (3) the governmental
agencies undertook the procurement “for governmental purposes and not with a

2014]

HEATED SKIRMISHES IN THE SOLAR SECTOR

713

Likely, Italy also would need to refute China’s argument that the
above-average prices of solar-based electricity in the Italian
wholesale market signify that the electricity is being sold for more
than adequate remuneration.192 Italy would need to verify that its
steps to regress its FITs and to downsize its FIT Program have
reduced remuneration back to market level.193 If the Appellate Body
finds that the measures taken to reduce the price of solar-based
electricity in the Italian wholesale market have not reduced
remuneration to market level, it may overturn the Panel’s ruling and
find that the Italian FIT Program conferred a “benefit” to Italian
solar-PV generation companies under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.

B. ITALY SHOULD ELIMINATE THE DCR COMPONENT OF ITS FIT
PROGRAM TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE III:4 OF THE
GATT 1994 AND ARTICLE 2.1 OF THE TRIMS AGREEMENT
In the event that the Appellate Body affirms the Panel Decision,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body likely will request that Italy
remove the DCR from its FIT Program.194 At a Dispute Settlement
Board (“Board”) meeting thirty days after the date of adoption of the
Panel Decision, the Respondent likely will inform the Board of its
intention to implement any recommendations.195
Notably, if Italy disregards the recommendations made by the
Panel, China may decide to suspend concessions and raise barriers to
entry against imports from the European Union.196 China may also
view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale”).
192. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
193. But see Gipe, New Italian Tariffs, supra note 34 (emphasizing that, despite
reports that the new Italian FIT program dramatically cuts tariffs, as of 2011 the
tariffs remained fifty to seventy percent higher than comparative tariffs when
adjusted for high levels of solar radiation energy).
194. See DSU arts. 8, 19(1) (explaining that the Appellate Body will
recommend that the Respondent bring the measure into conformity with the
covered agreements and will suggest ways to do so).
195. See id. art. 21(3) (adding that the Board will provide the party whose
measure is in violation of the agreements with a reasonable amount of time in
which to come into compliance).
196. See id. art. 22(2) (allowing the injured party to request to suspend its
concessions only after rounds of negotiations with the Respondent have failed); cf.
WTO Rules Ontario Green Energy Tariff Unfair, supra note 14 (reporting that
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request that a second panel be established to measure Italy’s
compliance with the Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendations,
and if the panel finds that Italy has failed to comply with the
recommendations, China may request money damages from Italy. 197
Noncompliance should not be an option for Italy, however, as it may
spark a trade war between two major trade partners—namely the
European Union and China—who likely wish to maintain amicable
trade relations with one another.198

C. ITALY SHOULD DISCONTINUE ITS FIT PROGRAM AND
IMPLEMENT ANOTHER RENEWABLE ENERGY PROGRAM
Because of the current economic downturn, Italy may choose to
discontinue its FIT Program altogether and implement another
renewable energy program. As electricity produced from solar-PV
energy becomes more self-sustaining and grows closer to reaching
grid-parity with fossil-fuel energy, Italy may conclude that FIT
support is either unnecessary or unsustainable.199 Italy’s FIT Program
has increased substantially the level of solar-PV energy in the Italian
market,200 but the costs of the Program have become burdensome for
the Italian budget.201
even though a WTO ruling is non-binding against the party in violation of WTO
rules, the complainant may implement tariffs against the party in violation).
197. See DSU art. 21(5) (“Where there is disagreement as to the existence or
consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to
these dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the
original panel.”).
198. See David J. Unger, While Solar Booms, a Trade Row Intensifies,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/
Environment/Energy-Voices/2012/1110/While-solar-booms-a-trade-rowintensifies (reporting that “tit-for-tat escalations” over solar panels are not helping
to avoid a full-blown trade war).
199. See Michael Ruoff et al., European Solar Markets: There Is Life After
Feed-in Tariffs, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, INT’L NEWS: FOCUS ON ENERGY,
no. 2, 2012, at 8, available at http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/1aa3ab69#/
1aa3ab69/8 (acknowledging that grid-parity is close in European countries with
high insolation and high electricity prices).
200. See Did Italy Install Two or Seven GW in 2010?, RENEWABLES INT’L (Jan.
26, 2011), http://www.renewablesinternational.net/did-italy-install-two-or-sevengw-in-2010/150/510/30021/ (noting that while Germany had installed a record
seven to eight gigawatts (“GW”) of photovoltaics in 2009, Italy also may have
installed close to that number of gigawatts).
201. See Ruoff et al., supra note 199, at 9 (noting that because the price for the
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If, as experts claim, renewable energy sources are reaching gridparity with traditional energy sources, then certain EU Member
States may no longer need FITs as a high-level incentive.202 As an
alternative, solar-PV generation companies may enter into powerpurchase agreements in which large utilities and industrial customers
are prepared to agree on power prices that are higher than current
electricity prices.203 In this light, Italy may gradually phase out its
FIT Program by continuing to pare down tariffs to more sustainable
levels.204

V. CONCLUSION
A ruling by the prospective WTO Panel that Italy’s DCR violates
the national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT
1994 and Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMS Agreement would be
consistent with WTO jurisprudence.205 Yet, a ruling that the FIT
Program itself does not constitute a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the
SCM Agreement would reshape WTO jurisprudence.206 If the FIT
Program remains consistent with the WTO covered agreements and
continues to encourage the growth of solar-PV generation, it may

sale of electricity in Italy grew from ninety euros to one hundred euros in 2011,
and the price will only rise in the future, the FIT has become less relevant and less
viable than self-consumption or direct sale); cf. Scott, supra note 184 (discussing
Italy’s drastic cuts in public subsidies).
202. See “We No Longer Need Feed-in Tariffs”, RENEWABLES INT’L (Jan. 21,
2013), http://www.renewablesinternational.net/ we-no- longer- need- feed-intariffs/150/510/59834/ (opining that because Europe has reached grid-parity with
nuclear and coal power, the PV industry no longer needs feed-in tariffs).
203. See Ruoff et al., supra note 199, at 9; “We No Longer Need Feed-in
Tariffs”, supra note 202 (hypothesizing that, starting in 2013, solar markets will
focus less on feed-in tariffs and more on direct consumption and power trading).
204. See Italian PV Market Set for Disaster as New Incentive Budget Could Be
Blown,
PV
MARKET
RESEARCH
(July
23,
2012),
http://www.pvmarketresearch.com/pressrelease/Italian_PV_Market_Set_for_Disaster_as_New_Incentive_Budget_Could_b
e_Blown/5 (reporting that the three GW of installations completed through the
Fifth Energy Bill raised the annual cost of incentives and reduced the budget for
plants).
205. See Wilke, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that a finding by the WTO Panel
that the “Buy-Ontario” clause is illegal under WTO law “would not be news to
trade law experts”).
206. See id. (highlighting that a ruling on the subsidy question would clarify
outstanding legal questions and introduce greater legal certainty).
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allow Italy to reach its renewable energy goal by 2020207 and reduce
its FIT rates even more drastically than the current degressions have
allowed.208 Italy need only decide whether it will continue to rely
upon FITs as an important policy tool and to what extent it will fund
FITs in the future.209

207. Cf. Italy to Cut Renewable Energy Subsidies, UNITED PRESS INT’L (April
2, 2012, 6:30AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/ EnergyResources/2012/
04/02/Italy-to-cut-renewable-energy-subsidies/UPI-52381333362600/ (stating that
because Italy produces forty-one GW of electricity from solar-PV energy and has
360,000 active plants, it could reach its goal of 29.4%).
208. See id. (reporting that FITs have generated a burden on taxpayers and, with
the boom, the Italian Government will likely cut FIT tariffs because it would have
to pay out $59 billion over the next twenty years).
209. Cf. Roselund, supra note 179 (“Falling prices mean that PV energy is
becoming cost-competitive without subsidies.”).

